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It is the right of the United States, as a sovereign nation, to
decide who may or may not enter its territory.' In addition, this
right extends to the removal of those previously admitted who
have outstayed their welcome and those who entered illegally and
have since been discovered.' The power to remove or admit an
alien from the United States lies with the Executive Branch of
government. Normally, after the Executive Branch decides to
remove an alien, the United States sends the excluded alien to
another country. However, in a growing number of cases, no
country will accept the excluded aliens. This development has left
the United States with two choices: 1) detain the aliens, possibly
indefinitely, until another country accepts them; or 2) release them
into the United States.
When an alien comes to its border, the United States decides
whether to admit the alien. If the United States excludes the alien,
then the United States labels that particular alien an "excludable"
or "inadmissible" alien.3  Once this decision is made, the
excludable alien is normally "removed" to another country.
Sometimes, for humanitarian reasons, these excluded aliens are
* Edward Bates Cole, an Assistant State Attorney in Jacksonville, Florida, received
his Juris Doctor with Honors from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
where he was an Articles Editor for the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation.
I The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338
U.S. 537 (1950); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Zadvydas v. United
States, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
2 Id.
3 The term "excludable" was replaced by "inadmissible" with the passage of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, INA § 235, 8
U.S.C. § 1225 [hereinafter IIRIRA]. This article uses the two interchangeably.
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"paroled" into the United States under the idea of an "entry
fiction."4 This concept allows the United States to remove the
alien at any time after his or her entry into the United States
without a hearing and treats the alien, for constitutional purposes,
as if he or she never entered the country.
Aliens who gain legal entry into the United States or who are
able to enter without detection must have a hearing, affording
them some degree of procedural due process, before the United
States can remove them. If the United States decides to remove an
alien, it must conduct a hearing and make a determination that the
individual is "deportable." Deportable aliens differ from
excludable aliens in that the United States government recognizes
the presence of the former group.
Normally, the distinction is unimportant because the United
States deports or removes members of both classes. In some
circumstances, however, no country is willing to accept these
aliens and the question becomes, "[c]an the United States detain
them indefinitely or should they be released into American
communities?" This question exposes a tension between
competing ideals: 1) the Constitutional protection of liberty and
the collective distaste for incarceration without due process; and 2)
the United States's sovereign right to control who enters its
country and its need to protect its communities from dangerous
people.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)5 provides that any
alien who has been deemed removable or inadmissible and "who
has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the
community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may
be detained beyond the removal period."6 In addition, the INA
requires the Attorney General to take into custody any alien
deemed inadmissible or deportable because of a criminal violation.
Once detained, the United States will release the alien only if: 1) it
is necessary to do so in order to protect witnesses in criminal
investigations and prosecutions, 2) the alien will not pose a danger
to the safety of others or to property, and 3) the alien is likely to
4 Shaughnessy v. United States, ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
5 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1994 ed. and
Supp. V).
6 INA § 241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(6).
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appear at all scheduled proceedings.7
After the 1996 INA revisions were enacted, Attorney General
Janet Reno interpreted it as mandating the detention of all aliens
convicted of the specified crimes, and further decided that,
pursuant to her authority under INA § 241, those aliens the United
States could not remove or deport should be detained indefinitely.8
Justice Department officials feared that if these detainees
committed crimes while paroled, then the political fallout would
be massive.9 The Clinton Administration was unwilling to take
such a risk, despite the fact that Democrats decried the new law. °
As a result, the number of INS detainees grew rapidly during the
late 1990s, reaching almost 20,000 by the beginning of 2001."
There is no doubt that the Constitution prohibits the indefinite
detention of U.S. citizens without due process of law,12 and
although the Fifth Amendment may seem to extend this protection
non-citizens, the Supreme Court has not interpreted it this way. 3
Specifically, in 1953, the Court held that excludable aliens, who
remain in the United States, have no Fifth Amendment right
guaranteeing them release into the United States.' 4
This is so because the United States does not recognize the
physical presence of excludable aliens who remain in the country,
and the Constitutional right to liberty does not attach to those
outside the country's borders. 5  This rationale remained
7 Id. § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
8 Id.; see Diane Marrero, Nowhere to Call Home, Detainees Stuck in U.S. Jails as
Native Countries Refuse to Take Them Back, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Feb. 20, 2001, at Al.
9 Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Wash. 1999). "'Due to the political
and community pressure, the INS... has every incentive to continue to detain aliens
with aggravated felony convictions."' Id. at 1157 (quoting St. John v. McElroy, 917 F.
Supp. 243, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
10 Marrero, supra note 8.
11 Id. This detention cost the Government almost a billion dollars annually. Id.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.").
13 See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)
(recognizing that the due process required by the Fifth Amendment for citizens is
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unchallenged 6 for nearly 50 years. 7
Then, on January 31, 2001, a United States Court of Appeals
ruled, in Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, that an immigration statute
allowing indefinite detention of excludable aliens without due
process is facially unconstitutional.' 8 A few months later, on June
28, 2001, in Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court ruled that
indefinite detention of deportable aliens without due process of
law raises a serious constitutional question. 9 However, in order to
avoid deciding the constitutional question, the Court interpreted
INA § 241 as not allowing indefinite detention, 2 and the Court
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the statute as applied to
inadmissible aliens.'
At present, the circuits may disagree as to inadmissible and
excludable aliens.2 However, if the Supreme Court faces the
indefinite detention of excludable aliens, then it should strike it
down. If the Supreme Court does so, then the INSt would be
16 But see Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1386-89 (10th Cir.
1981) (stating in dicta that an excludable alien "in physical custody within the United
States may not be 'punished' without protections of the Fifth Amendment). Note that
the court did not actually find indefinite detention to be unconstitutional, but rather,
interpreted the applicable immigration statute as not permitting indefinite detention. Id.
at 1386-90.
7 Zadvydas v. Davis resolved a conflict that existed between the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Compare Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th
Cir. 1999) (holding the indefinite detention of deportable aliens to be constitutional) with
Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000) (interpreting INA § 241(a)(c) as not allowing
for detention of deportable aliens beyond nine months).
18 238 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2001), en banc hearing denied, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
7898 (6th Cir. 2001), vacated by Thoms v. Rosales-Garcia, 122 S. Ct. 662, 151 L. Ed. 2d
577 (2001).
19 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 692-94.
22 Zadvydas construed INA § 241 as limiting the detention of deportable aliens to
nine months in order to avoid finding the statute unconstitutional. Id. The Court declined
to extend their ruling to excludable and inadmissible aliens. Id. Thus, it is unclear
whether the eleven circuits will interpret § 241 as limiting the detention of excludable
and inadmissible aliens or whether they will interpret Zadvydas to mean that Mezei
continues to allow the indefinite detention of excludable and inadmissible aliens but not
deportable aliens.
t Under the newly-formed Department of Homeland Security, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service is now known as the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
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required to scrutinize each individual trying to gain entry into the
United States and protect those aliens who might otherwise be
labeled inadmissible and then paroled into the country. The INS
could protect such aliens by affording them the same protections
granted other aliens in the United States. Finally, if the INS
knows that a particular individual poses a danger to the United
States or its citizens, then the INS must disallow that particular
alien's entry into the United States.
This article discusses the jurisprudence behind the Supreme
Court's decision in Zadvydas and its effect on Rosales-Garcia and
other cases involving the constitutionality of indefinite detention
of excludable and inadmissible aliens.23 Section 1124 discusses the
factual background and the holdings in Zadvydas and Rosales-
Garcia. Section III analyzes the effect of Zadvydas and likely
future Court rulings." Section IV concludes that the Constitution
and section 241 of the INA should apply to excludable and
inadmissible aliens as it does to deportable aliens. Such an
interpretation will promote the safety of United States citizens and
its visitors, and it will protect the liberty interests of all aliens in
the United States.26
II. Legal Background
In 1950, the Supreme Court, in Knauff v. Shaughnessy, ruled
"[w]hatever the [removal] procedure authorized by Congress is, it
is [Fifth Amendment] due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned., 27 In 1953, based on this rationale, the Court handed
down the landmark decision of Shaughnessy v. Mezei, where it
ruled that indefinite detention of excludable aliens is constitutional
if authorized by Congress.28 The courts further applied this ruling
to aliens whom the United States sought to deport.29
Services. However, for the purposes of this paper, this organization will be continue to
be referred to as the INS. Ed.
23 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678; Rosales-Garcia, 238 F.3d 704.
24 See infra notes 27-180 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 181-246 and accompanying text.
26 See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
27 338 U.S. at 544 (1950).
28 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
29 Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 531 U.S. 924 (2000).
2003]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
In 2000, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Ma v. Reno,
split from other circuits and construed the INA as barring
indefinite detention." In Zadvydas v. Davis,31 the Supreme Court
resolved the split between the Fifth Circuit's decision in Zadvydas
v. Underdown32 and the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ma v. Reno.33
A. Zadvydas
1. Facts
Kestutis Zadvydas was born to parents of Lithuanian descent
on November 21, 1948, in a displaced persons' camp in a region
of post-World War II Germany governed by the United States.34
In 1956, eight-year-old Zadvydas came to the United States with
his parents, beneficiaries of a program for relocating displaced
persons.35
Zadvydas, at the age of seventeen, began a long career as a
criminal. Twice convicted of attempted robbery in New York,
once in 1966 and again in 1974,36 Zadvydas found himself in the
custody of Virginia authorities in 1987 charged with possession of
474 grams of cocaine.37 While out on bail and awaiting trial,
Zadvydas fled to Houston, Texas. While in Houston, Zadvydas
managed to avoid the authorities until turning himself in to the
police in 1992.38
Subsequently convicted of possession of cocaine with the
intent to distribute in Virginia on August 17, 1992, Zadvydas
30 Id. Before the Supreme Court's June 2001 decision in the case, John Ashcroft
was substituted as the nominal party for Janet Reno. Id.
31 The full case title is Kestutis Zadvydas, Petitioner v. Christine Davis and
Immigration and Naturalization Service; John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al.
Petitioners v. Kim Ho Ma.
32 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 531 U.S. 923 (2000). Prior to the
Supreme Court's June 2001 decision in the case, Christine Davis was substituted as the
nominal party for Lynne Underdown and thus the decided case was Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678 (2001).
33 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 531 U.S. 924 (2000).
34 United States v. Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (E.D. La. 1997).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1999).
38 Id.
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received a sentence of sixteen years in prison, six of which were
suspended. 39  After serving just two years of his sentence,
Zadvydas was released on parole.4 ° However, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) immediately took him into
custody in order to begin deportation proceedings.4 In fact, the
INS had been trying to hold deportation proceedings against
Zadvydas since 1977, when it first charged him as being
deportable.42
Pending disposition of the initial 1977 deportation proceeding,
the INS released Zadvydas on his own recognizance.43 Five years
later, in July 1982, the INS notified Zadvydas, by mail, that it
would schedule his hearing for August 25, 1982."4 Zadvydas
failed to appear.4 5 The enforcement arm of the INS did not hear
from Zadvydas again until 1992 when he turned himself in to the
police.46 During the intervening ten years, Zadvydas had married,
fathered a child, held a job, obtained re-issuance of his green
card,47 and filed income tax returns.48 He claimed he did not
receive any of the letters the INS sent during this time.49
The INS held Zadvydas without bond because the immigration
judge5" determined that he would probably fail to appear for future
39 Id.
40 Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. at 1015.
41 Id.





47 A "green card" is proof of lawful permanent resident (LPR) status. INA §
101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20). LPRs are those aliens who have "the status of
having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States
as an immigrant ... " Id. They are one step away from naturalized citizenship. Id. §
316, 8 U.S.C. § 1427. An LPR may, however, be deported if he commits a listed offense
under IIRIRA. Id. § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225.
48 Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. at 1014.
49 Id.
50 Immigration judges are Administrative Law Judges and employees of the INS,
which is within the Department of Justice. See Department of Labor,
http://www.dol.gov/dol/organization.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2003). They do not have
life tenure and their proceedings are governed by the Administrative Procedures Act
2003]
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proceedings.5 At his March 29, 1994, deportation proceeding,
Zadvydas admitted his criminal history and conceded
deportability.5 2 Zadvydas applied for a waiver53 but was denied on
April 26, 1994, and ordered deported from the United States to
Germany.1
4
In May 1994, the INS began Zadvydas's deportation; however,
it soon found that no country would take him." Zadvydas claimed
German citizenship, which the German government denied
because his parents were Lithuanian.56 Lithuania also denied
Zadvydas citizenship and refused to accept him.57 Zadvydas is
"stateless," that is, he is a citizen of no country. 8 Faced with an
inability to deport Zadvydas, the INS settled on indefinite
detention. 9
2. Eastern District of Louisiana Federal District Court
Decision
In September 1995, Zadvydas applied to the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana for a writ of habeas
corpus.6' The court framed the issue as "whether a legal alien who
is under a final order of deportation may be permanently
(APA). Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-7532 (2001). Their
decisions are reviewable by U.S. district courts, but under the Plenary Power Doctrine
applied in LN.S. v. Chadha the review is limited. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
51 Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. at 1015.
52 Id.
53 INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed 1996).
54 Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. at 1015.
55 Id.
56 Id. Birth in Germany alone does not confer German citizenship. Zadvydas v.
Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1999). Unlike the United States, where
citizenship is inherent to all those born within its borders, Germany, like many other
countries, also requires some degree of German ancestry. Id. Zadvydas's parents were
not of German ancestry, but rather were displaced Lithuanians temporarily living in
Germany. Id.
57 Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. at 1015.
58 Id. "The fact of the matter is that the petitioner is not now nor has he ever been a
citizen of any country." Id. at 1027.
59 Id. at 1015.
60 Zadvydas, 185 F.3d at 283.
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incarcerated because the INS cannot find a country to take him."'"
The court found that Congress had granted the INS authority to
take an alien into custody pending deportation62 and continue
detention, unless the alien can show the INS that he poses no
danger to society and is not a flight risk if released.63 Thus, the
court concluded, "that 'indefinite detention of deportable aliens
who are aggravated felons is statutorily authorized when
immediate deportation is not possible and the alien has not
overcome the presumption against his release."' 64 Then the court
considered whether this comported with constitutional principles.65
Initially the district court noted that "the Fifth Amendment's
61 Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. at 1023-24. The court noted that "control over matters
of immigration and naturalization is the 'inherent and inalienable right of every
sovereign and independent nation."' Id. at 1024 (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893)). It further noted that the Constitution vested this
authority in the legislative branch of the government, which authority is plenary and only
subject to limited judicial review. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, cl. 8, § 4 and Fiallo v.
Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)). Nevertheless, the court noted, "aliens, both legal and illegal,
are entitled to the constitutional protection of due process, equal protection and
reasonable bail." Id. (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976)).
62 Id. The INA provides that:
The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien convicted of an
aggravated felony upon release of the alien (regardless of whether or not such
release is on parole, supervised release, or probation, and regardless of the
possibility of rearrest or further confinement in respect of the same offense).
Notwithstanding paragraph (1) or subsections (c) and (d) but subject to
subparagraph (B), the Attorney General shall not release such felon from
custody.
INA § 212(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A), amended by Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death-Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(c)(1) (deleting provisions
allowing release of nondangerous nonflight-risk detainees).
63 Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. at 1024. The INA further provides:
The Attorney General may not release from custody any lawfully admitted alien
who has been convicted of an aggravated felony, either before or after a
determination of deportability, unless the alien demonstrates to the satisfaction
of the Attorney General that such alien is not a threat to the community and that
the alien is likely to appear before any scheduled hearings.
INA § 212(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), amended by Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death-Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(c)(1) (deleting provisions allowing
release of nondangerous nonflight-risk detainees).
64 Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. at 1025 (quoting Tran v. Caplinger, 847 F. Supp. 469,
474 (W.D. La. 1993)).
65 Id. at 1025-27.
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mandate that 'no person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law' applies to persons within the
territorial United States and not just U.S. citizens."66 The court
next looked at the nature of the detention and whether it was
punitive in nature or served some alternate purpose.67 Based on
the legislative history and based on the stated purposes of
protecting the community from habitual criminals and preventing
aliens from fleeing before deportation, the court concluded that the
detention was not for the purpose of punishment.68
Then the court turned its attention to the question of whether
the detention was "excessive in relation to" its purpose.69 The
court stated that the "detention is intended for the sole purpose of
effecting deportation" and when it becomes clear that deportation
is not a possibility, "detention is no longer a temporary measure in
the process of deportation."' 0
In examining the question of excessiveness, the court
considered Tran v. Caplinger, a case from the Western District of
Louisiana, which held indefinite detention of deportable aliens not
to be excessive." The Zadvydas court rejected Tran's
conclusion.72 Although the court noted that the Fifth Circuit
allowed indefinite detention of excludable aliens, the Zadvydas
court did not feel bound by the Fifth Circuit decision because
Zadvydas was a deportable alien.73
Finally, the court looked at pre-1952 precedent and found that
several courts had held unconstitutional the indefinite detention of
66 Id. at 1025 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V and citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 210-12 (1982) and Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896)).
67 Id. at 1025-26. In Gisbert v. United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1441
(5th Cir. 1993), the Fifth Circuit held that, when determining its constitutionality, the
court must consider the purpose of the detention.
68 Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. at 1026 (citing Caballero v. Caplinger, 914 F. Supp.
1374 (E.D. La. 1996) and Tran v. Caplinger, 847 F. Supp. 469, 474 (W.D. La. 1993)).
69 Id.
70 Id. The court analogized detention pending deportation to detention pending
trial and stated that neither is justifiable unless it is a temporary measure. Id. (quoting
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981)).
71 847 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. La. 1993).
72 Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. at 1026 (citing Tran, 847 F. Supp. 469).
73 Id. (citing Gisbert v. United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1441 (5th Cir.
1993)).
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any sane citizen or alien, except as punishment for a crime.74 The
court also examined other, more recent, cases, which held that if
deportation is not possible within the foreseeable future, then
detention for this purpose may not extend beyond a reasonable
time - often interpreted as two to four months.75 Thus, the court
ruled that indefinite detention of Kestutis Zadvydas was excessive,
and therefore, unconstitutional.76 Accordingly, the district court
granted Zadvydas's application for a writ of habeas corpus and
ordered his release by December 12, 1997, forty-eight days after
the writ was issued.77 The INS timely appealed.78
3. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
The Fifth Circuit determined that Zadvydas was governed by
the most recent version of IIRIRA,79 specifically § 305(c),8" which
provides:
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible
under section [212] of this title, removable under
section [237](a)(1)(C)8' . . . of this title or who has
been determined by the Attorney General to be a
risk to the community or unlikely to comply with
74 Id. (citing Petition of Brooks, 5 F.2d 238 (D. Mass. 1925) and United States ex
rel. Ross v. Wallis, 279 F. 401 (2d Cir. 1922)).
75 Id. at 1027 (citing Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 792 (D. Kan.
1980)). The district court noted that Congress subsequently passed INA § 242(c), which
has since been repealed, limiting detention of deportable aliens to six months. Id. (citing
INA § 242(c), 8 U.S.C. 1252(c) (repealed 1996)). The court did not discuss at length the
constitutionality of Congress's shift in policy away from detention of a limited duration
toward indefinite detention. But, the court did state that based on the rationale of
Fernandez and other cases and § 242(c), that Zadvydas's "detention of nearly four years
with no end in sight, and the probability of permanent confinement, is an excessive
means of accomplishing the purposes sought to be served by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)." Id.
(citing INA § 242(a)-(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)-(c)).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1027-28. The court ruled on October 30, 1997, and provided for a
November 12, 1997, hearing at which time the court would set the conditions for
Zadvydas's release from INS custody. Id.
78 Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1999).
79 Id. at 286-87.
80 Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 123 l(a)(6).
81 This section includes aliens, such as Zadvydas, convicted of aggravated felonies
or controlled substance violations. Id.
2003]
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the order of removal, may be detained beyond the
removal period.8"
The court interpreted this section to mean the decision to
detain an alien, such as Zadvydas, indefinitely was purely within
the discretion of the Executive Branch.83  The regulations
promulgated to enforce the statute called for the release of aliens,
like Zadvydas, who were not "a threat to the community" and
were "likely to comply with the removal order."84 The regulations
also called for: 1) review of the status of such aliens to determine
whether release is appropriate; 2) a listing of the reasons for the
custody or release decision; and 3) an opportunity to appeal any
decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 5
The Fifth Circuit determined that these procedures ensured that
Zadvydas's detention was finite and when Zadvydas no longer
posed a threat to the community "he would doubtless be
released."86 The court also disputed the district court's finding that
Zadvydas would never be deported, acknowledging that "locating
a country to which Zadvydas may be deported has been and will
be difficult at best." However, the court optimistically
concluded that some country might accept Zadvydas.88
The court discussed at length its decision in Gisbert v. United
82 Id.
83 Zadvydas, 185 F.3d at 287.
84 Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(2)(ii), 236.1(d)(3)(iii), 241.4 and 241.5 and
February 3, 1999, "Memorandum for Regional Directors" from INS Executive Associate
Commissioner Michael A. Pearson concerning "Detention Procedures for Aliens Whose
Immediate Repatriation is Not Possible or Practicable" [hereinafter "Pearson
Memorandum"]).
85 Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(2)(ii), 236.1(d)(3)(iii), 241.4 and 241.5 and
Pearson Memorandum, supra note 84).
86 Id. at 288.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 291. The court went on a lengthy discussion of the failed efforts to return
Zadvydas to Germany and Lithuania, but seemed to suggest that unexplored options
remained, specifically, continuing to explore the possibility of getting Germany or
Lithuania to accept him or, in the alternative, attempting to establish Russian citizenship
on behalf of Zadvydas and deport him there. Id. at 291-94. The Fifth Circuit seemed to
have trouble accepting the conclusion that Zadvydas is "stateless," instead contending
that while it will be difficult to establish his citizenship, surely he is a citizen of some
country. Id. at 292.
[Vol. 28
EXCLUDABLE VERSUS DEPORTABLE ALIENS
States Attorney General,89 where it ruled that indefinite detention
of excludable aliens is permissible under the Constitution.9" In
Zadvydas, the Fifth Circuit stated "we do not believe that the
difference between excludable aliens and resident aliens mandates
a radical departure from the reasoning of Gisbert when, as here, a
final decision to deport the once resident alien has been made."91
Zadvydas exhorted the court to find that there is a difference in
constitutional protections afforded excludable aliens and
deportable resident aliens.9" The court declined to do so, stating
"there is little, if any, room for distinction between the rights...
of excludable aliens and resident aliens when their circumstances
89 988 F.2d 1437, 1441 (1993).
90 Zadvydas, 185 F.3d at 288-90. In Gisbert, the Fifth Circuit relied on the
proposition that under the Constitution, the "power to 'establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization' is placed in the legislative branch while the executive branch enjoys the
"'power to control the foreign affairs of the nation."' Id. at 288 (citing U.S. CONST. art.
I, sec. 8, cl. 4 and United States ex. rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950)).
The court explained that "these principles taken together" make it clear that "'the power
to expel or exclude aliens [is] a fundamental sovereign"' power and that this power is
"essentially plenary." Id. at 288-89 (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 209 (1953)). The Gisbert court did not dispute that aliens "claim
some constitutional protections," such as the right to be free from punishment without
due process of law but noted that "because of their special position, certain
classifications and restrictions that would be intolerable if applied to citizens are
allowable when applied to resident aliens." Id. (citing Cabel v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S.
432 (1982)). Based on its understanding of the division of power as to immigration
matters, the Gisbert court concluded that "excludable aliens may be detained pending
deportation without such detention constituting unconstitutional punishment, even when
the alien's country of origin indicates it will not accept their return." Id. at 290 (citing
Gisbert, 988 F.2d at 1448). In Gisbert, the detainees contended that their detention
constituted punishment without a criminal trial and was indefinite in nature. Id. at 290.
This argument was rejected by the Fifth Circuit, which ruled the detention to be
administrative in nature and not indefinite. Id.
91 Id. at 290.
92 Id. at 294. The reality is that resident aliens are one step away from citizenship
and often have lived in this country for some time. In addition, they have been granted
entry into this country and permission to live here. Excludable aliens, on the other hand,
are those who have been rejected as they tried to enter this country. While it is true that
many have been paroled for various reasons-and therefore are physically in this
country-most courts, including the Mezei court, recognize a legal fiction known as the
"entry fiction" that treats excludable aliens as if they are still outside our borders. This
legal fiction denies the excludable aliens the same protection as other aliens who are
either legally or illegally within our borders.
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are so similar."93 Thus, it ruled, "Zadvydas's detention is currently
within the core area of the government's plenary immigration
power and thus does not violate substantive due process."94
Zadvydas petitioned for a rehearing en banc, but the court
denied his petition. 95 Subsequently, he petitioned for a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court; the Court granted certiorari on
October 10, 2000. The case was consolidated with Reno v. Ma,96
allowing the Supreme Court to address the difference between the
Ninth and Fifth circuits regarding the detention of removable
aliens.97
B. Ma
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington
considered five lead cases from over one hundred petitions for
writs of habeas corpus that concerned the constitutionality of
indefinitely detaining non-deportable aliens. 98  The petitioners
were lawful permanent residents of the United States whom the
United States ordered deported due to crimes they committed.99
They all faced long-term, possibly indefinite, INS detention.' °
For the sake of uniformity and efficiency, a panel of five district
judges decided the constitutional issues, with individual
application of the decision to the facts of each claim to follow.'0 '
1. Facts
Ma was born in Cambodia in 1977. At the age of seven, he
came to the United States as a refugee and became a lawful
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Zadvydas v. Underdown, 199 F.3d 441 (1999).
96 531 U.S. 924 (2000).
97 Zadvydas v. Underdown, 531 U.S. 923 (2000).
98 Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1151 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 id. at 1151, 1158. In fact, not all of the five lead petitioners were granted a writ
of habeas corpus upon review. Batyuchenko v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (W.D. Wash.
1999). Mr. Batyuchenko challenged his order of deportation, not his indefinite
detention; thus, under the plenary power doctrine, the district court denied jurisdiction
and dismissed his petition. Id. at 1164-65.
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permanent resident two years later in 1987.102 In 1995, at age
seventeen, Ma received a conviction for first-degree manslaughter
for an act involving a gang-related killing. He received a sentence
of thirty-eight months imprisonment."' Due to good behavior, he
left confinement after twenty-six months, at which time the INS
took him into custody, placed him in deportation proceedings, and
subsequently ordered him removed in 1997.04 Subject to a final
deportation order, Ma was in INS custody until 1999 when the
case came to the district court.1
0 5
2. Western District of Washington Federal District Court
Decision
The district court considered the statutory framework that
affected the petitioners and then ruled on both the procedural and
substantive due process claims of the petitioners." 6 The court
asserted that Fifth Amendment "protection extends to all 'persons'
within the borders of the United States, including deportable
aliens."'0 7 Based on the "entry fiction" recognized in Shaughnessy
v. United States, ex rel. Mezei, 1°8 the court acknowledged the
exception for aliens in exclusion proceedings, whether the United
States detains the alien at the border or paroles the alien into the
country. However, the court made unequivocal its position that
102 Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 818-19 (9th Cir. 2000). The history outlined by the
district court contained inconsistencies, and so the more thorough histories reported by
the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court are used for purposes of this note. For the
factual account given by the Supreme Court, see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 685-
86 (2001).
103 Ma, 208 F.3d at 819.
104 Kim Ho Ma v. I.N.S., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1166 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
105 Id.
106 Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1151-52 (W.D. Wash. 1999). The statutory
framework used by the Washington District Court was similar to that which was used in
Zadvydas. See Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. 1011, 1024-25 (E.D. La. 1997).
107 Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1153. (citing Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21,
32-33 (1982)).
108 Id. at 1153-54 (citing Shaughnessy v. United States, ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953) and Barrera-Echeveria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
Barrera-Echeveria was initially decided in favor of the petitioner, but then overruled by
the en banc court, which applied the Mezei case without distinguishing it as the prior
decision had. Barrera-Echeveria v. Rison, 21 F.3d 314 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'den banc, 44
F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. Cal. 1995).
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lawful permanent residents were entitled to a higher standard of
due process than excludable aliens were, even after the United
States enters an order of deportation against them.1 °9
The court then turned its attention to the petitioners'
substantive due process claims." l At issue was the "petitioners'
fundamental liberty interest in being free from incarceration.' 11
The court looked at the nature of the detention and concluded it
was for regulatory purposes.1 12  The court recognized three
legitimate government purposes for detention: "(1) ensuring the
removal of aliens ordered deported; (2) preventing flight prior to
deportation; and (3) protecting the public from dangerous
felons. 113  The court then considered whether the petitioners'
"detention[s] [were] excessive in relation to these government
interests."1 4 It employed a sliding scale where "as the probability
that the government can actually deport an alien decreases, the
government's interest in detaining that alien becomes less
compelling and the invasion into the alien's liberty more
severe."' 15 Because "detention by the INS can be lawful only in
109 Phan, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1154. The court noted that "'once an alien gains
admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent
residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly' and that the "petitioners are
long-time permanent legal residents of the United States and, as such, are 'persons'
entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment, despite having been ordered
deported." Id. (quoting Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32).
110 Id. at 1154-56.
111 Id. at 1154 (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992), for the
proposition that "[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause").
112 Id. at 1154-55 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993)). The court
rejected the government's assertion that the plenary power doctrine constrained their
jurisdiction over this issue saying:
While the plenary power doctrine supports judicial deference to the
legislative and executive branches on substantive immigration
matters, such deference does not extend to post-deportation order
detention. Indefinite detention of aliens ordered deported is not a
matter of immigration policy; it is only a means by which the
government implements Congress's directives.
Id. at 1155.
113 Id. at 1155-56 (citing INA § 241(a)(c), 8 U.S.C. § 123 l(a)(c)).
114 Id. at 1156 (emphasis omitted).
115 Id.
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aid of deportation," the court ruled it "excessive to detain an alien
indefinitely if deportation will never occur. ' 116
Next, the court considered the procedural due process claims,
noting that the constitutional sufficiency of any set of procedures
depends on the circumstances.117 Accordingly, it reviewed "the
existing procedural framework, [and] then [it] consider[ed] 'the
interest at stake for the individual, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of the interest through the procedures used as well as
the probable value of additional or different procedural safeguards,
and the interest of the government in using the current
procedures."118 The court again identified the petitioners' interest
as "freedom."119 It then said "release decisions are based upon
either the [INS] District Director's review of the alien's written
submissions and administrative file or an interview with the alien,"
but found this procedure lacking because "'[d]ue to political and
community pressure, the INS... has every incentive to continue
to detain aliens with aggravated felony convictions.""'12
Based on its "review of the record," the district court found the
"INS does not meaningfully and impartially review the petitioners'
custody status" because it does not use "any individualized
assessment or consideration of the petitioners' situations in light of
the [regulations]."'2 1 Thus, the court ruled "[a]t a minimum, each
petitioner is entitled to a fair and impartial hearing before an
immigration judge at which he or she can present evidence to
support release" and that the "immigration judge must actually
consider the factors set forth" in the regulations and how they
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1156-58.
118 Id. at 1156.
119 Id. at 1157.
120 Id. at 1157 (quoting St. John v. McElroy, 917 F. Supp. 243, 251 (S.D.N.Y.
1996). The court noted that "[o]ther courts faced with similar situations have expressed
'little confidence' in release determinations by District Directors" because "instead of
individually assessing dangerousness and flight risk, Directors simply relied on the
aliens' past criminal history and the fact that they were facing removal." Id. (citing Alba
v. McElroy, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17796 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Thomas v. McElroy, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12445 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Cruz-Taveras v. McElroy, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11516 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
121 Id. at 1157; see 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 (2002).
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apply to the individual petitioner. 22
The district court made an individual determination for Kim
Ho Ma four days later.'23 Citing the joint order, the court said
"[t]he government's continued detention of Ma violates his right
to substantive due process if it is excessive in relation to the
government's interests in effectuating his deportation.' ' 124 Faced
with what it considered an incomplete record, the court scheduled
a hearing on the matter of whether the INS had sought to deport
Ma and whether such deportation was foreseeable in order to
apply the balancing test. 125 On September 29, 1999, the district
court granted Ma's writ of habeas corpus.1
26
3. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
The Ninth Circuit considered "whether . . . the Attorney
General has the legal authority to hold Ma . . . in detention
indefinitely, perhaps for the rest of his life.' '127 While noting that
the district court's ruling found a basis in the constitutionality of
the INS's detention policy, the Ninth Circuit began its analysis by
examining the statutory authority granted the INS and the
Attorney General. 2 8
122 Phan, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1157; see 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 (2002). The problem created
by this portion of the ruling is that it would allow judicial review of agency decisions in
order to discover if the adjudicator considered the factors in the regulation and applied
them to the facts of each petitioner. This would seem to violate the plenary power
doctrine.
123 Ma v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (W.D. Wash.
1999).
124 Id. at 1166 (citing Phan, 56 F. Supp. 2d, at 1149).
125 Id. The record contained no evidence as to whether the government had sought
the assistance of the Cambodian government or whether Cambodia was likely to accept
Ma. Id. In addition, there was an indication that Ma had made a Torture Convention
Claim, but the court did not know what to make of this. Id.; see Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 23 1.L.M.
1027; (December 10, 1984), entered into force June 26, 1987; for the United States
November 20, 1994, ratified by § 2242(b) of the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998 and 8 C.F.R. § 208 as amended by Regulations Concerning
the Convention Against Torture: Interim Rule 64 FR 8478-92 (February 19, 1999)
(effective March 22, 1999); 64 FR 13881 (March 31, 1999).
126 Ma, 208 F.3d at 819. There does not appear to be a published opinion associated
with this order.
127 Id. at 818.
128 Id. at 820.
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The court noted that the general framework for removal called
for removal within ninety days after an order became
administratively final, 129 but removal within the ninety-day period
was not always possible, in particular when the alien's country of
origin does not have a repatriation agreement with the United
States. 3 ' The court found that many deportable aliens must be
released, subject to rigorous supervisory regulations, 3' but that
others, including Ma, "'may be detained beyond the removal
period."" 32  Looking at the statute's text, the court stated that it
compelled neither the government's assertion that it allowed for
indefinite detention, nor Ma's assertion that this authority does not
extend to those aliens whose removal is not likely in the
foreseeable future.'33
Thus, the Ninth Circuit perceived its duty of statutory
construction as requiring it to read in a restriction on the length of
time detention may continue beyond the ninety-day removal
period.'34 The Ninth Circuit ruled that "Congress did not grant the
INS authority to detain indefinitely aliens who.., have entered
the United States and cannot be removed to their native land
pursuant to a repatriation agreement," instead construing "the
statute as providing the INS with authority to detain aliens only for
a reasonable time."'
135
129 Id. (citing INA §§ 241(a)(1)(A)-(B) and 241(a)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. §§
1231 (a)(1)(A)-(B) and 1231 (a)(1)(B)(ii)).
130 Id. at 820-21. The court identified three categories of aliens whose removal
extends beyond the ninety-day period. Id. The first are those individuals who simply
require more processing time, the second are those aliens who have been ordered
removed to countries with which the United States does not have a repatriation
agreement, specifically, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos, and the third category includes
those aliens, like Zadvydas, who are "stateless." Id.
131 Id. (citing INA § 241(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(3)). The regulations provide for,
among other things, regular appearances before an immigration officer, maintaining
records of whereabouts and employment with the INS, submitting to medical and
psychiatric testing, and severe travel restrictions. INA § 241(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. §
123 1(a)(3).
132 Id. (emphasis omitted)(quoting INA § 241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(6)). Ma is
placed in this group because of his conviction for first degree manslaughter. Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. The two options the court referenced were "indefinite" detention and
detention for a "reasonable time." Id.
135 Id. at 821-22.
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The court felt this construction: 1) avoided the issue of
whether indefinite detention by the INS violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment;'36 2) was the most reasonable;'37
3) was consistent with other Ninth Circuit opinions construing
similar provisions in other immigration statutes; 38 and 4) was the
most consistent with international law. 139 Accordingly, the lower
court decision was upheld for different reasons, and the Ninth
Circuit ruled that Ma's detention had already exceeded a
reasonable time. 140  The government petitioned for a writ of
136 Id. at 822. The government argued that the Barrera-Echeveria decision holding
that indefinite detention of excludable aliens comports with the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. Id. at 823. The Ninth Circuit made clear that the situation of excludable
aliens was very different than that of LPRs subject to a final order of removal, noting
that Barrera-Echeveria spoke to the fact that Supreme Court jurisprudence on
immigration law has long made a distinction between excludable aliens and those who
have entered our country, extending far more constitutional protection to those who are
within our borders. Id. at 825-26. Were the court to have construed the statute as
allowing indefinite detention, it would have faced a "substantial constitutional question."
Id. at 827. In addressing Zadvydas, the Ninth Circuit made clear that, while it was not
ruling on the constitutionality of indefinite detention, it would likely not agree with the
Fifth Circuit's conclusion that indefinite detention is constitutional. Id. at 827.
137 Id. at 822. The court reasoned that the provision allowing the INS to hold
individuals beyond the ninety-day period demonstrated Congress's intent that the ninety-
day time limit not be absolute in all cases, not to allow indefinite detention. Id. at 827.
It felt that "some greater degree of specificity or demonstration of congressional intent
would be necessary" before it could conclude that any statute would grant the INS so
much authority, and it felt it unreasonable to presume Congress would approve of such a
drastic measure in so vague a manner. Id. at 827-28.
138 Id. at 822; see Spector v. Landon, 209 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1954), Wolk v.
Weedin, 58 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1932), Saksagansky v. Weedin, 53 F.2d 13 (9th Cir.
1931), Caranica v. Nagle, 28 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1928); see also United States ex rel.
Ross v. Wallis, 279 F. 401 (2d Cir. 1922).
139 Ma, 208 F.3d at 822. The court applied the Charming Betsy rule, which requires
that courts generally should avoid construing statutes in a manner that would make them
violate international law. Id. at 830 (citing Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982)
(citing Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 117-18 (1804))). The court
then noted that a "'clear international prohibition' exists against prolonged arbitrary
detention." Id. (citing Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir.
1998)). Also, the court cited Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), providing that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest and
detention." ICCPR, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 54, ratified by
the United States on April 2, 1992, 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-84. Therefore, the court said
"construing the statute to authorize the indefinite detention of removable aliens might
violate international law." Ma, 208 F.3d at 830.
140 Ma, 208 F.3d at 831.
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certiorari to the Supreme Court. The Court granted the writ on
October 10, 2000, and the case was consolidated with Zadvydas v.
Underdown.
141
C. Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Zadvydas and Ma in
order to resolve a conflict between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. 4 2
It delivered a five-to-four opinion143 and remanded the two cases
to their respective circuits for further proceedings consistent with
the opinion of the Court. 144
The Court first set out, in pertinent part, the statute authorizing
detention "beyond the removal period" of aliens the Government
fails to remove during the ninety-day removal period.145  Then it
addressed "whether this post-removal-period statute authorizes the
Attorney General to detain a removable alien indefinitely beyond
the removal period or only for a period reasonably necessary to
secure the alien's removal.'
146
The Government argued that, by its words, INA § 241 allows
the Government, in the discretion of the Attorney General, to
detain aliens like Zadvydas and Ma for as long as it deems
necessary. 147  The Court felt that indefinite detention of an alien
141 Zadvydas v. Underdown, 531 U.S. 923 (2000), Reno v. Ma, 531 U.S. 924
(2000).
142 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682-86 (2001).
143 Id. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Justices
Ginsberg, O'Conner, Souter, and Stevens. Id. at 682-702. Justice Scalia was joined by
Justice Thomas in a dissent as to part I. Id. at 702-05. In a separate dissent, Justice
Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas as to
part I also. Id. at 705-25.
144 Id. at 702.
145 Id. at 683 (quoting INA § 241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (Supp. V 1994)).
146 Id. at 682. Significantly, the Court makes clear that it is not considering the
statute's application to "[a]liens who have not yet gained initial admission to this
country," because that "would create a very different question." Id. By stating this at
the outset, the Court narrows its ruling to those aliens subject to an order for removal and
expressly does not consider the plight of excludable aliens such as Mario Rosales-
Garcia. See Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 238 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2001). This is despite the
fact that, like the issue of deportable aliens, there is also a split in the circuits as to the
interpretation and constitutionality of § 241(a)(6) as it applies to excludable aliens. See
id.; Gisbert v. United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437 (5th Cir. 1993).
147 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688-89 (referencing INA § 241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. §
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would, at the least, raise a serious constitutional question because
the "Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause forbids the
Government to 'deprive' any 'person... of... liberty... without
due process of law."" 48  The Court also said "'it is a cardinal
principle' of statutory interpretation... that when an Act of
Congress raises a 'serious doubt' as to its constitutionality, 'this
Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.'"149 For this
reason, the Court "read an implicit limitation into INA §
241(a)(6)."' 5 ° The Court stated that, in its view, "the statute, read
in light of the Constitution's demands, limits an alien's post-
removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring
about that alien's removal from the United States."''
Focusing on the statute's purposes, the Court said that once
removal in the near future is no longer possible, the concern over
flight risk is relatively weak. 52 As for the goal of "protecting the
community," the Court acknowledged that it does not diminish
over time,'53 but said that this alone cannot justify indefinite
detention without some limitation to "specially dangerous
individuals" who have exhibited "some other special
circumstance, such as mental illness" and who are afforded
"strong procedural protections."'' 5 4 The Court was troubled by the
123 1(a)(6) (Supp. V 1994)).
148 Id. at 689-90. The Court cited Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992), for
the proposition that "[f]reedom from imprisonment-from government custody,
detention, or other forms of physical restraint-lies at the heart of the liberty" protected
by the Fifth Amendment. Id at 690. The Court also noted that in United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987), a case that allowed pre-trial detention of certain
criminals, the decision was limited to "criminal proceeding[s] with adequate procedural
protections." Id.
149 Id. (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
150 Id. at 689 (referencing 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(6) (Supp. V 1994)).
151 Id.
152 Id. at 690.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 691. The Court cites Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997), as
"upholding [a] scheme that imposes detention upon 'a small segment of particularly
dangerous individuals' and provides 'strict procedural safeguards' and cites United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, at 747, 750-52 (1987), as "upholding pretrial detention,
stressing (1) 'stringent time limitations,' (2) the fact that detention is reserved for the
'most serious of crimes,' (3) the requirement of proof of dangerousness by clear and
[Vol. 28
EXCLUDABLE VERSUS DEPORTABLE ALIENS
lack of procedural safeguards and the indefinite nature of the
detention, as well as the breadth of the application of INA §
241(a)(6) to "aliens ordered removed for many and various
reasons, including tourist visa violations." ''  Thus, the Court
concluded, besides dangerousness, the only "special circumstance"
that exists is "the alien's removable status itself, which bears no
relation to a detainee's dangerousness."' 156
Next, the Court addressed the Government's contention that,
under Mezei it has constitutional authority to detain indefinitely
both excludable and deportable aliens.' 57 The Court was quick to
distinguish between the two because, for constitutional purposes,
Mezei was treated "'as if stopped at the border,"' 158 and this "made
all the difference." '159 Thus, the Court said, "[i]n light of this
critical distinction between Mezei and the present cases, Mezei
does not offer the Government significant support, and we need
not consider the aliens' claim that subsequent developments have
undermined Mezei's legal authority."161
Construing the statute, the Court found no "clear indication of
congressional intent to grant the Attorney General the power to
hold indefinitely in confinement an alien ordered removed."'61
Instead, the Court read an implied limit for detention to a "period
reasonably necessary to secure removal" of the alien, where
reasonableness would depend on the "set of particular
convincing evidence, and (4) the presence of judicial safeguards." Id.
155 Id. (citing INA § 241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(6) (Supp. V 1994) (referencing
1NA § 237(a)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)). The Court very carefully noted that this
case might be decided differently if the statute were tailored narrowly to only affect "'a
small segment of particularly dangerous individuals' such as "suspected terrorists." Id.
(quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368 (1997)).
156 Id. at 691-92.
157 Id. at 692.
158 Id. at 692-93 (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
213, 215 (1953)).
159 Id. at 693.
160 Id. at 694.
161 Id. at 696-97. The Court noted that the basic purpose of the statute was to
effectuate deportation and, so, once deportation becomes unlikely, the Court reasoned,
the purpose of the statute could not be furthered by continuing to detain aliens. Id. The
Court also examined the history of the statute and found nothing that clearly
demonstrated an "intent to authorize indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention." Id. at
699.
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circumstances" related to each individual. 162 It further stated that
courts "should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the
statute's basic purpose, namely assuring the alien's presence at the
moment of removal,"'' 63 and that "if removal is not reasonably
foreseeable, [a] court should hold continued detention
unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute."'' 64 As a bright-
line rule, the Court held that after an additional six months beyond
the original ninety-day removal period, detention is presumptively
unreasonable and the burden falls on the Government to rebut this
presumption. 161
The Court remanded the two cases for consideration in light of
its opinion. 166  With regard to Zadvydas, the Court said the
requirement that an alien show "the absence of any prospect of
removal" was too high a standard to bear. 67 As to Ma, the Court
ruled that more findings needed to be made as to the likelihood of
successful future negotiations for a repatriation agreement
between the United States and Cambodia. 168 Justice Kennedy, in
his dissent, accepted the "premise that a substantial constitutional
question is presented by the prospect of lengthy, even unending,
detention," but rejected the statutory construction of the majority.
He claimed that it "has no basis in the language or structure of the
INA and in fact contradicts and defeats the purpose set forth in the
express terms of the statutory text. ' 169
Kennedy's dissent also found the majority opinion to be
inconsistent with Mezei, which the majority declined to
overturn. 17 The INA § 241(a)(6) allows for detention beyond the
ninety-day removal period for not only deportable aliens but also
162 Id. at 699.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 699-700. The Court expressly approved of supervised release and the
ability to return the alien to custody for violations of the supervisory conditions. Id.
165 Id. at 700-02.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 702.
169 Id. at 706-07.
170 Id. at 719-20 (citing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei 345 U.S. 206
(1953)).
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for excludable aliens. 1 Thus, the dissent stated that by reading in
a time limitation as to deportable aliens, reason dictates that you
must also read a reasonable time limitation as to excludable
aliens. 7 2 Limiting the Government's power to regulate excludable
aliens and their admission into the country would, in Kennedy's
opinion, infringe on the legislative and executive branches'
plenary power over immigration and naturalization matters by
forcing the Government to let excludable aliens into the country.173
The Kennedy dissent also criticized the majority on a number
of public policy grounds.'74 In sum, Kennedy contends that the
current regime of periodic review satisfies the due process clause
and is "real, not illusory."'75 He suggests that it would be better to
evaluate the procedures, to ensure that they continue to protect the
interests of the deportable aliens.176
D. Ma and Zadvydas on Remand
On remand, the Ninth Circuit reissued its opinion in Ma v.
Reno,'77 with a clarification regarding the likelihood of eventual
deportation.'78 The Fifth Circuit, in Zadvydas v. Davis,7 9 upheld
171 Id. at 710. See INA § 241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (Supp. V 1994).
172 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 710. It is not plausible to imply a time limit as to one class
and not the other.
173 Id.
174 Id. 713-18. Kennedy suggests that: (1) the new rule would "encourage dilatory
and obstructive tactics by aliens" seeking to make "their own repatriation or transfer
seem [un]foreseeable;" (2) the "risk to the community posed by ... [the aliens] is far
from insubstantial;" and (3) the new rule would open the flood gates, causing nearly all
deportable and excludable aliens in custody to reenter the community. Id. at 713-14.
Significantly, the dissent viewed the majority's opinion as "broad enough to require even
that inadmissible and excludable aliens detained at the border be set free in our
community." Id. at 716. Justice Scalia joined in the dissent, writing separately. Id. at
702-05. He felt that whatever process is due, it does not mandate release of any
deportable, excludable, or inadmissible aliens into the community. Id. He did share
Kennedy's view that the majority opinion is inconsistent with Mezei. Id.
175 Id. at 723.
176 Id. at 724-25.
177 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000).
178 Ma. v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit made clear
that it was not just the lack of a repatriation agreement with Cambodia, but also the lack
of any negotiations between the countries that made removal unlikely. Id. at 1099.
179 285 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2002).
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the district court's ruling; it found that it is unlikely Zadvydas will
be deported any time in the foreseeable future. 8 '
III. Analysis
Zadvydas seemed to clear the waters for lawful permanent
residents deemed removable or deportable. However, it only
muddied the waters for those aliens deemed excludable. What of
their fate: indefinite detention, or supervised release? Is the "entry
fiction" dead, or did the Supreme Court's careful sidestepping of
the issue mean that the doctrine is alive-and-well? In addition, it
is unclear what effect Zadvydas has on suspected terrorists, whose
indefinite detention is authorized by the INA. 8'
A. Effect on Deportable Aliens
While many hailed Zadvydas as a landmark decision, the Court
left open the possibility for more narrowly tailored regulations to
allow for indefinite detention when the alien's dangerousness
coincides with a "special circumstance."' 18 2  In response to the
decision, the current administration has been working busily to
undermine Zadvydas by enumerating several such "special
circumstances." '183 Under its new regulations, the INS may
180 Id. The district court previously granted a writ of habeas corpus to Zadvydas.
United States v. Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. 1011 (E.D. La. 1997).
181 INA § 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226a. However, according to 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(6)
(Supp. 2002) (a revised statute) an alien may be detained for additional periods up to 6
months only if the release of the alien will threaten national security.
182 See INA § 241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. 123 l(a)(6) (Supp. V 1994).
183 See Alfonso Chardy, Long-Term Detention Unconstitutional, but... INS Allows
'Special Circumstances 'for Indefinite Custody, SUNDAY GAZETTE MAIL, Nov. 25, 2001,
at C4, available at LEXIS, News Library, All News Group File. Cheryl Little, executive
director of the Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center described the new regulations as "a
serious effort to circumvent the Supreme Court decision that indefinite detention is
unconstitutional." Alfonso Chardy, New INS Detainee Regulations Dance on
Interpretation of Supreme Court Ruling, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 24, 2001, available at
LEXIS, News Library, News Group File. In a hearing before the House Judiciary's sub-
committee on Immigration and Claims, Joseph Greene, INS Acting Deputy Director
Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations, and Edward McElroy, INS
District Director for New York, testified that the Supreme Court "recognized that there
may be special circumstances, such as those involving terrorists or especially dangerous
individuals" for whom "continued detention may be appropriate even if removal is
unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future." Prepared Statement of Joseph Greene,
Acting Deputy Director Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations, and
[Vol. 28
EXCLUDABLE VERSUS DEPORTABLE ALIENS
continue to detain aliens covered by Zadvydas indefinitely if they
1) have "a highly contagious disease;" '84 2) have been "detained
on account of serious adverse foreign policy consequences of
release;"' 5 3) have been "detained on account of security or
terrorism concerns; '  or 4) are "determined to be specially
dangerous." '87 It remains to be seen how this provision will be
Edward McElroy, District Director, New York, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, House Committee on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001), available at LEXIS, U.S. Congress Library, Committee
Hearing Transcripts File [hereinafter Greene Statement]. The two then went on to assure
the subcommittee that "the INS recently issued regulations implementing the decision
and setting forth the new review process." Id; see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13-14 (2002)
(creating interim rules amending 8 C.F.R. 236 and 241, effective November 14, 2001).
184 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(b). The procedures require a medical examination and
continued treatment for such individuals and the INS is directed only to detain them on
the recommendation of the Public Health Service. Id. In addition, such individuals are
to be released once they no longer pose a threat. Id.
185 Id. § 241.14(c). This includes those whose entry or proposed activities in the
United States are deemed by the Secretary of State to "have potentially serious adverse
foreign policy consequences for the United States." See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C)(i)
(defining classes of aliens to be excluded from entry into the United States); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C) (defining classes of aliens that are to be deported from the United
States).
186 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(d). This includes aliens who have engaged in terrorist
activities at any time. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(A)-(B). See also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(4)(A). Terrorist activities include: 1) inciting or committing a terrorist activity
causing serious injury or death; 2) planning terrorist activities; 3) gathering information
on potential targets; 4) soliciting funds for terrorist activities, organizations, or
organizations that the alien should know are involved in terrorist activities; or 5)
committing an act that the alien knows or should know provides material support for
others engaged in terrorist activities, including offering transportation, a safe house, false
documentation or identification, funds, or weapons. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B).
187 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f). To be considered specially dangerous, an alien must have
1) committed a "Crime of Violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16; 2) be likely to engage in acts
of violence in the future, because of a mental condition or personality disorder; and (3)
there must be "no conditions of release [that] can be reasonably expected to ensure the
safety of the public." Id. § 241.14(f)(i)-(iii). Crimes of violence include assault, sexual
assault, burglary, and robbery, but not narcotics offenses or accessory after the fact to a
violent crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 16. Kim Ho Ma's first-degree manslaughter conviction
would no doubt be considered a crime of violence and Kestutis Zadvydas's attempted
robbery offenses may be considered crimes of violence if an element of them included
some force or attempted use of force. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); see
also United States v Galicia-Delgado, 130 F.3d 518 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that
attempted robbery falls within the definition of a "crime of violence").
20031
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implemented.188
The determining factors for a large number of immigrants will
be: 1) the requirement of a mental condition or personality
disorder that makes an alien more likely to commit crimes, and 2)
the requirement that there be an inability to create conditions of
release that will reasonably prevent such activity."' Having just
been adopted on an interim basis, there will surely be questions
regarding the meaning of these provisions and, depending on how
the INS chooses to implement the regulations, additional court
challenges. 9 °
B. Applicability to Excludable Aliens.
The Supreme Court in Zadvydas explicitly avoided ruling on
the constitutionality of indefinite detention of excludable aliens.'91
Before that decision, the Sixth Circuit, in Rosales-Garcia v.
Holland, ruled that INA § 241(a)(c) is unconstitutional as applied
to excludable aliens. 92  The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Thorns v. Rosales-Garcia, vacated the decision, and remanded the
case to the Sixth Circuit for a ruling in light of Zadvydas.'93
Below is a brief discussion of Rosales-Garcia and a discussion of
how Zadvydas likely will affect future cases involving excludable
aliens.
188 As of October 2001, eight hundred of the 3,400 detainees possibly covered by
Zadvydas had been released. Alfonso Chardy, New INS Detainee Regulations Dance on
Interpretation of Supreme Court Ruling, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 24, 2001, available at
LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
189 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)(ii)-(iii).
190 Under the regulations considered by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas, there were
several factors to be considered by the INS in determining whether to release an alien
whose deportation could not be effected. The INS essentially ignored them and detained
every alien it could. If such a situation arises again and all deportable aliens convicted of
crimes of violence are detained without consideration of their dangerousness and the
ability to place conditions on release to prevent further violence, then the Supreme Court
may face essentially the same question in determining whether there are "special
circumstances" allowing for continued detention. See generally Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678.
191 See id. at 696 (holding that aliens have liberty interests that raise constitutional
questions but failing to rule whether indefinite detention of aliens is constitutional).
192 Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 238 F.3d 704, 707 (6th Cir. 2001).
193 Thoms v. Rosales-Garcia, 534 U.S. 1063 (2001).
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1. Thoms v. Rosales-Garcia194
a. Facts
In 1980, more than 120,000 undocumented immigrants left the
port of Mariel, Cuba for the United States as part of the "Mariel
boatlift."'1 95 Many of these Mariel Cubans were put into exclusion
proceedings, but because of the mass of humanity facing the INS,
most were granted humanitarian parole.1 96 Over the years since
Mariel, several thousand of these paroled Mariel Cubans have
found themselves on the wrong side of the law and have had their
parole revoked.1 97 Cuba refuses to accept any of them back, which
leaves the United States in a quandary. 98
Beginning in 1996, with the passage of IIRIRA, the INS
started detaining excludable aliens with criminal convictions as
soon as their prison sentences ended. 99 With its new statutory
authority to detain excludable aliens indefinitely, the INS did so.200
These excludable aliens, along with deportable aliens like Ma and
Zadvydas, came to be known as "lifers" because they were held in
prisons with no chance for release and no hope of deportation.z1
By 2001, the number of lifers had reached almost 5,000, and
because few, if any, were being released, their numbers were only
growing. 2°z The cost of incarcerating lifers was approaching two
hundred fifty million dollars per year.0 3
194 Id.
195 Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 238 F.3d 704, 707 (6th Cir. 2001).
196 Id. at 707. See INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 212(d)(5)(A) (1994).
197 See Rosales-Garcia, 238 F.3d at 711.
198 See id.
199 See id. at 708-09.
200 See, e.g., Lise Olsen, Seattle 'Lifer' has his Day in Highest Court: INS holds
about 5000 'Indefinite' Detainees, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 20, 2001, at Al,
available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 See Dianne Marrero, Nowhere to Call Home, Detainees Stuck in U.S. Jails as
Native Countries Refuse to Take them Back, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Feb. 20, 2001, at Al,
available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File. There were twenty thousand INS
detainees at the time, approximately four thousand of them lifers. Id. The entire
detention was costing taxpayers nine hundred million dollars annually. Id.
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Mario Rosales-Garcia (Rosales) was a lifer. He came to the
United States on May 6, 1980, as part of the Mariel Boatlift. He
was deemed excludable and granted immigration parole.0 4
Subsequently, he was arrested and convicted of a number of
offenses, including possession of marijuana, resisting arrest, grand
theft, burglary, grand larceny, and escape from a penal
institution.25 Rosales's parole was revoked in 1986, but he was
released on parole two years later in 1988.206
Then, in 1993, Rosales was convicted of conspiracy to possess
with the intent to distribute cocaine.0 7 He was sentenced to sixty-
three months in prison to be followed by five years of supervised
release.20 8 On March 24, 1997, while serving his sentence, his
immigration parole was revoked again.20 9 When Rosales was
released from prison on May 18, 1997, the INS took him into
custody.2'0 Rosales was considered for immigration parole a third
time on November 5, 1997, but this time parole was denied due to
his "propensity to engage in recidivist criminal behavior.
211
Rosales remained in INS custody where he continued to receive
yearly consideration for parole under the Cuban Review Plan.212
b. Eastern District of Kentucky Decision
Rosales petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky on July 9, 1998, for a writ of habeas
corpus.213  The district court dismissed his petition on May 3,
1999, concluding that Congress had been granted total discretion
over immigration matters under the plenary power doctrine and
204 Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 238 F.3d 704, 707 (2001).
205 Id. at 707-08.
206 Id. at 708.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 708.
210 Id at 709.
211 Id.
212 See id. (noting that Rosales-Garcia receives periodic reviews of his parole
status); see also, 8 C.F.R. § 212.12 (2002) (providing that a parole review must occur
within one year of denial of parole).
213 Rosales-Garcia, 238 F.3d at 709. Rosales was being held at the Federal Medical
Facility in Lexington, Kentucky. Id. at 707.
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that the Constitution affords excludable aliens no greater
protection than what Congress deems appropriate.214
c. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
Rosales appealed this decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which considered "whether the executive branch of the
government has the authority under the United States Constitution
to detain a person indefinitely without charging him with a crime
or affording him a trial., 215 In a 2-1 decision, the court held that
"indefinite detention of Mario Rosales-Garcia cannot be justified
by reference to the government's plenary power over immigration
and that it violates Rosales's substantive due process rights under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment., 216  Next, the
court looked to see whether the Government's detention was
excessive in relation to its purpose of "protect[ing] society from a
person who poses a danger to other persons or property. 217 The
court concluded, based in part on the minimal INS review given
Rosales, that the indefinite detention of excludable aliens was
unconstitutionally excessive under Salerno.218  The Government
petitioned the Sixth Circuit for a rehearing en banc but was
denied.2t9
d. Carballo v. Luttrell
On October 11, 2001, in Carballo v. Luttrell, a panel of the
Sixth Circuit ruled on a case presenting the same issue as Rosales-
Garcia.2 0  The panel concluded, based on the Supreme Court's
214 See supra text accompanying note 27.
215 Rosales-Garcia, 238 F.3d at 715.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 722-23 (citing INA § 236(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (Supp. V 1994)). Other
courts have identified other purposes for detention, including protecting the
government's ability to deport the alien and preventing the alien from fleeing prior to
deportation. See, e.g., Hermanowski v. Farquaharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148, 149 (D. R.I.
1999), Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1155-56 (W.D. Wash. 1999), Vo v. Greene,
63 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1285 (D. Colo. 1999).
218 Rosales-Garcia, 238 F.3d at 723-24.
219 Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 7898 (6th Cir. 2001).
220 Carballo v. Luttrell, No. 99-5698, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 21695 (6th Cir. Oct.
11,2001).
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language in Zadvydas, that Mezei was expressly upheld, and
therefore, the court ruled that the indefinite detention of
excludable aliens is constitutional. 221  The Sixth Circuit vacated
Carballo and granted a rehearing en bane to reconsider the case
when, presumably, it will also resolve Rosales-Garcia.222
e. Supreme Court Decision
In Rosales-Garcia, Government petitioned the Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari, which was granted on December 10,
2001 .223 The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court decision
and remanded the case for further proceedings, in light of
Zadvydas. 22
4
f Sixth Circuit en banc Decision
On March 5, 2003, the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in
Rosales-Garcia v. Holland,225 ruling that INA § 241(a)(6) applies
to Excludable aliens as it does to removable aliens. As did the
Supreme Court in Zadvydas, the Sixth Circuit in Rosales-Garcia
declined to reach the constitutionality of indefinite detention of
removable or excludable aliens.
2. Where do we go from here?
It seems there are two routes the Circuit Courts of Appeal that
have yet to rule can take. They can rely on the language in
Zadvydas indicating approval and continued vitality for Mezei, or
they can latch onto the analysis of the detention under Salerno and
interpret the statute as applying to both excludable and deportable
221 Carballo, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 21695, at *39-*40. As the Carballo court
explained:
Although Mezei, like the present cases, involves indefinite detention, it differs
from the present cases in a critical respect .... His presence on Ellis Island did
not count as entry into the United States. Hence, he was "treated," for
constitutional purposes, "as if stopped at the border."... And that made all the
difference.
Id. at *40 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692 (quoting Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213-15 (1952)).
222 Carballo v. Luttrell, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25351 (6th Cir. 2001).
223 Thorns v. Rosales-Garcia, 534 U.S. 1063 (2001).
224 Id.
225 2003 FED App. 0070P (6th Cir.) (March 5, 2003)
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aliens in the same way.
The INS asserts that Zadvydas did not alter its authority to
detain excludable aliens indefinitely. 26 In the most recent INS
regulations, the INS continues to have the same authority to detain
excludable aliens, including those who have been paroled into the
country, that it enjoyed before Zadvydas.227  Despite the INS's
vociferous denial that Zadvydas alters the landscape of
constitutional protections afforded excludable aliens, many people
of varying points of view think otherwise. It is true that Zadvydas
did not specifically consider the plight of the excludable alien,228
but nonetheless, as Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Chief
Justice Rhenquist all agree, it is inconsistent to say that INA §
241(a)(6) can be construed so as to place a reasonable time
limitation on the detention of removable resident aliens and
construed differently as it applies to excludable aliens. 29 In
addition to the dissenting justices, immigrant advocacy groups feel
Zadvydas applies to excludable aliens, offering them the same
protection from unreasonable detention that it grants removable
aliens.230 Practitioners have said that Zadvydas is, at least, relevant
226 Greene Statement, supra note 183. "The Court's decision does not apply to
arriving aliens-those still technically at our borders and paroled in (including groups
such as Mariel Cubans who are treated as still seeking admission)." Id.
227 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 241.4, 241.13 (2002). The same authority to detain
indefinitely appears in § 236.1, and the same procedures for review are found in § 241.4.
Id. The new section, § 241.13 states: "This section does not apply to: (i) arriving aliens,
including those who have not entered the United States, those who have been granted
immigration parole into the United States, and Mariel Cubans." Id. § 241.13(b)(3).
Mariel Cubans are not reviewed under the same criteria as other excludable aliens in
indefinite detention; they are reviewed under a procedure set out in 8 C.F.R. § 212.12(b).
Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 212.12(b) (2002).
228 Id. at 695 (distinguishing the case of the excludable alien from that of the
removable alien, denying that Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953) applies). The majority stated that "aliens who have not yet gained initial
admission to this country would present a very different question;" a question the court
declined to answer, however. Id. at 682.
229 Id. at 710 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is not a plausible construction of §
[241](a)(6) to imply a time limit as to one class but not to another."). In a separate
dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia states that "Mezei thus stands
unexplained and undistinguished by the Court's opinion." Id. at 704 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
230 Chardy, supra note 183. Cheryl Little, executive director of Miami-based
Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center told Knight-Ridder newspapers that "in her view
[Zadvydas] covers 'excludable aliens."' Id.
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to the issue,23 though others doubt Zadvydas in any way changes
the applicability of Mezei.23 2 Because Zadvydas did not expressly
apply to excludable aliens, the determination of whether their
indefinite detention is permissible is, at this time, left up to the
circuits.
Since Zadvydas was decided on June 28, 2001,233 courts in
seven circuits, including the Sixth Circuit in Rosales-Garcia,234
have ruled on the applicability of INA § 241 to excludable aliens.
Courts in the Third,235 Fourth,236 Fifth, 237 and Seventh238 Circuits
have ruled that indefinite detention of excludable aliens is
authorized by INA § 241 and the Constitution. The Ninth Circuit
in Xi v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv.239 overturned its
earlier decision in Navarro v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service 24  on May 8, 2002, and ruled that the limitation on
231 Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court Trims Congress' Sails on Immigration Control,
MIAMI DAILY Bus. REV., July 11, 2001, at A10. In reacting to Zadvydas, attorney Seth
M. Stodder of Gibson, Dunn, and Crutcher in Washington D.C. said an excludable alien
"case may be back in the Supreme Court in a few years" and felt Zadvydas may play a
role in its resolution. Id.
232 Carri Geer Thevenot, Nevada Detainees: Effect of Court Ruling is Unclear, LAS
VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, July 16, 2001, at lB. Assistant Federal Public Defender Rene
Valladares, whose office represents twenty-one excludable aliens, described Zadvydas as
a "bleak opinion for excludables." Id.
233 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678.
234 2003 FED App. 0070P (6th Cir.) (March 5, 2003).
235 Chaves-Rivas v. Olsen, 207 F. Supp. 2d 326 (D.N.J. 2002); Damas-Garcia v.
United States, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17498 (D.N.J. 2001).
236 Morales v. Conley, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (S.D. W.Va. 2002).
237 Rollaro-Suarez v. Pratt, 3-01-CV-1419-G, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19196 (N.D.
Tex. 2001 Nov. 21, 2001); Vera v. Estrada, 3-01-CV-1044-X, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18992 (N.D. Tex. 2001 Nov. 19, 2001); Beltran-Leonard v. Immigration and
Naturalization Serv., 3-00-CV-2142-G, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13999 (N.D. Tex. 2001
Sept. 7, 2001); Nodarse v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D. Tex. 2001);
Fernandez-Fajardo v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 193 F. Supp. 2d 877 (M.D.
La. 2001).
238 Guerra v. Olson, 24 Fed. Appx. 617 (7th Cir. 2001); Hoyte-Mesa v. Ashcroft,
272 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2001).
239 298 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Moreno-Pena v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 26412 (9th Cir. 2002).
240 Manuel Navarro v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, No. 01-15111, 2002
U.S. App. LEXIS 6538 (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 2002) (holding that Zadvydas did not apply to
excludable aliens).
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detention in INA § 241 recognized by Zadvydas also applied to
excludable aliens, thus creating a split in the circuits. A district
court has also held that Zadvydas requires excludable aliens to be
treated the same as deportable aliens.24'
In Borrero and Xi, the courts held that, because they were
applying the exact same statute being construed in Zadvydas, they
were bound by the interpretation given by the Supreme Court.242
According to the Ninth Circuit, the statute "does not draw any
distinction -between individuals who are removable on grounds of
inadmissibility and those removable on grounds of
deportability. ' '243 Relying on the reasoning in Kennedy's dissent,
the Court said, "'it is not a plausible construction of [INA§
241(a)(6)] to imply a time limit as to one class but not to
another. ' 24
4
Due to the split in the circuits, the Supreme Court will likely
feel obligated to wade back into this matter. If so, then the Court
might find that one statute applies differently with different classes
of aliens, allowing for indefinite detention of excludable aliens,
while detaining removable aliens for a reasonable time. More
likely, the Court could rule that the statute also imposes a
limitation on detention of excludable aliens for a reasonable time.
In addition, it would force the Court to reconsider the Mezei
doctrine.
Another possible outcome would be for Congress to create
different provisions for excludable aliens and deportable aliens.
This approach would avoid the problem highlighted by the
Zadvydas dissent and the decisions in Xi and Borrero.245 It might
still create a split in the circuits, as evidenced by Rosales-
Garcia.246  Thus, the Supreme Court would be invited to either
interpret the new statute in the same manner it did in Zadvydas or
241 Borerro v. Aljets, No. 00-2351, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21829 (D. Minn. Dec.
18, 2001).
242 See id. at * 18-20; see also Xi, 298 F.3d at 833-34.
243 Xi, 298 F.3d at 835. See Borrero 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212829, at *18 (The
statute "clearly indicates, on its face, that it is equally applicable to both
inadmissible/excludable aliens and to otherwise removable aliens.").
244 Xi, 298 F.3d at 837; Borrero 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212829 at *19 (quoting
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 710 (2001)).
245 Borrero, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21829 at *18-20.
246 Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 238 F.3d 704 (2001).
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rely on Mezei in ruling that indefinite detention of excludable
aliens, if authorized by Congress, is constitutional. If Congress
decides to go down this path, it may elect to tighten the wording of
INA § 241 so as to mandate indefinite detention, thereby forcing
the Supreme Court to decide the constitutional question. In such a
scenario, the Supreme Court would be invited to rule on the
constitutionality of Mezei and the indefinite detention of
excludable aliens. Whatever the mechanism, it seems likely this
issue will not go away anytime soon.
IV. Conclusion
As a nation, we see protecting our borders as a key to national
security. There is disagreement in what this means and in how we
should go about the process, but no one disputes that we need to
bar dangerous people. Our concern over this issue has risen to the
top of the political agenda recently, in the wake of the World
Trade Center attacks and the revealed ineptness of the INS.247
What, then, should we do about these excludable and
inadmissible aliens? With regard to new immigrants arriving at
our borders and ports of entry, we should scrutinize them carefully
and not admit them if we deem them to be a danger to our nation's
safety. While this may sound obvious, we have not been doing it.
For example, with the Mariel Cubans, rather than make
individual inquiries when they arrived, we simply labeled large
numbers who came without proper documentation as excludable
and then paroled them into the country. Under the entry fiction,
paroling the Mariel Cubans allowed us to remove any of these
parolees at a later date. While this may sound reasonable, it did
not prove to be a good policy because thousands of Mariel
Cubans, many of them criminals in Cuba, committed serious
crimes in this country. How can it be reasonable for the INS to
determine how dangerous these individuals are by first releasing
them into the population? No matter how difficult the process,
surely it would have been better to make the inquiry before
releasing aliens into the country, thereby sparing our citizens and
visitors from danger.
247 David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, A Nation Challenged: The Borders; Bush
Leans Toward New Agency To Control Who and What Enters, N.Y. TIMES, March 19
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Forcing the INS to make this inquiry before physically
allowing an alien entry into the country would also protect the
alien from arbitrary action by the INS. Once physically present
beyond the border, the alien would enjoy the constitutional
protections of due process afforded other similarly situated aliens.
Of course, if an alien commits a crime, it is our prerogative to
deport him or her.
It is true that some cannot actually be deported and that
indefinite detention is not acceptable under Zadvydas. Despite
this, the INS may impose conditions of release for these
undeportable and unremovable aliens; surely, it is less expensive
to impose even the harshest terms of supervised release than it is
to imprison these individuals. Additionally, we are not precluded
from incarcerating these aliens if they commit additional crimes.
We are simply precluded from incarcerating them without
charging and convicting them of a crime.
In the future, if faced with the issue of indefinitely detaining
excludable aliens, then the Supreme Court should strike down the
entry fiction. This would force the INS to carefully scrutinize
each individual trying to gain entry into the United States. It
would also protect those aliens who might otherwise be labeled
inadmissible and then paroled into the country by affording them
the same protections granted other aliens in our country. If
individuals are known to be dangerous, we should not allow them
into the country at all.
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